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•	CDED	3 February 1958
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

BULLETIN



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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

3 February 1958

DAILY BRIEF

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LATE ITEM

* Preliminary analysis of latest Bulganin letter: Premier Bulganin's letter to President Eisenhower delivered on 2 February seeks to portray the President's 12 January message as unresponsive to previous Soviet proposals for a summit conference. Bulganin reiterated opposition to a preparatory meeting of foreign ministers, but attempted to carry the US-Soviet exchange one step nearer a summit conference by emphasizing that there should be no difficulty in solving the procedural problems for such a meeting through diplomatic channels.

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

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DAILY BRIEF

I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

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USSR - Rapacki plan: Following five days of talks between Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko and Polish Foreign Minister Rapacki in Moscow, the two governments announced full Warsaw Pact approval of the Rapacki Plan, and a willingness to discuss an "effective system of controls" for a nuclear-free zone in central Europe. These discussions were probably a follow-up to the mid-January talks between Khrushchev and Gomulka. Khrushchev, in a London Times interview printed on the same day, stated that the USSR, "did not exclude the possibility" of supplementing the plan by an agreement on conventional troops in the areas concerned. The emphasis on control measures in the announcement is aimed at further stimulating Western interest.

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Communist reaction to US earth satellite: The Sino-Soviet bloc countries have informed their people of the launching of the US earth satellite, but have pointed disparagingly to the differences in size between Explorer and Sputnik II. Official Soviet spokesmen have extended congratulations, while one Polish scientist in Warsaw asserted that the American achievement is 'far more important' than the two Russian Sputniks.

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
DAILY BRIEF

Premier Djuanda recently wrote to Sukarno asking him to cut short his "vacation" in view of the present political situation. Sukarno had intended to leave Japan for Djakarta

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I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

No back-up material.

II. ASIA-AFRICA

Proclamation of Egyptian-Syrian Unity

The proclamation joining Egypt and Syria into a "United Arab Republic" on 1 February has evoked serious misgivings among leaders in those Arab states now committed to the West, who fear the unity movement's strong popular appeal in their countries. High Christian officials of Lebanon's pro-Western government fear an end to the precarious balance between Christians and Moslems as the Moslem majority falls under the spell of Arab unity. Some moderate officials foresee pressure to draw Lebanon away from its Western orientation and ultimately into some form of union with the new Arab republic. In Jordan, King Hussayn's effort to offset the Egyptian-Syrian move by promoting confederation with Iraq and Saudi Arabia, ostensibly in a parallel expression of the unity urge, has failed to blunt Nasir's propaganda initiative. Any move by the mutually suspicious monarchies toward a loose confederation rivaling Nasir's union would invite charges from Cairo that they were hostile to the cause of Arab unity.

Syria's ultranationalist Baath party press declared that "although imperialism is stationed in Jordan, Iraq and Lebanon, Arab nationalism will not let it remain there long." Precedent for adherence of monarchies to the new "republic" is suggested by an Egyptian press statement on 2 February that Yemen would join shortly. Expressions of enthusiasm by high Egyptian officials, however, have been conspicuously few.

Details for implementing this union remain obscure, even for high officials of the two governments. According to most reports, the next step is parliamentary ratification, scheduled for 5 February. A plebiscite is to be held within 30 days to approve the union and elect its president.

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Early Violence on Cyprus Threatened

Violence on Cyprus seems likely to be resumed within 48 hours after the results of the Anglo-Turkish talks in Ankara become known in Greek circles. British officials plan to inform Athens soon of their new proposals for a solution to the Cyprus problem, probably on or before 3 February. The Greek Cypriots are sure to reject these plans if, as seems probable, they assure the Turkish minority on Cyprus an eventual separate right of self-demination, the obvious result of which would be partition.

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In anticipation of trouble, the Greek ethnarchy council has apparently decided to recommend an intensification of passive resistance against the British rather than to support a campaign of renewed violence. There is no assurance, however, that EOKA can be restrained. The Turkish Cypriot underground organization has also urged a campaign of passive resistance against the British, but threatens retaliation for all "individual or collective" Greek attacks against Turkish Cypriots.

Turkish nationalist and anti-British sentiments are being aroused by the press in Turkey and in Cyprus over the seven deaths that resulted from the use of British force against Turkish Cypriot demonstrators, but the government apparently has the situation under control.

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III. THE WEST

NATO Countries See West Faced with Summit Meeting

France is proposing that a special expert group of American, British, and French representatives be convened in Paris to prepare for eventual talks with the USSR.

This proposal reflects the feeling of the representatives on the North Atlantic Council that a summit conference is almost certain. They agreed on 30 January that the NATO position of last December, which envisaged only the possibility of a foreign ministers' conference on disarmament, had been overtaken. Opinions differed on the composition of a conference and the procedures desired, but there was unanimous support for Secretary General Spaak's warning that chaos would result unless the West made thorough prior preparations and reached agreed positions.

The Canadian view that preparatory consultations should not be at the foreign-minister level was supported by the German representative, who cited Chancellor Adenauer's proposal for diplomatic approaches in Moscow. The other NATO representatives did not appear concerned about the level at which advance preparations should be conducted.

Opinions on which countries should be included in a summit meeting were more varied, with only France and Germany insisting that the four-power concept should not be abandoned. Most of the representatives appeared to agree with the Canadian position that while it was desirable to have as limited a number of participants as possible, it would be difficult to resist a Soviet demand for "equality of representation."

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Republic" on 1 February will have a strong popular appeal in Arab states now under pro-Western governments, particularly Lebanon and Jordan. Following expected approval of the proclamation by the Egyptian and Syrian parliaments on 5 February, a plebiscite will be held within one month to approve the union and elect its president.

Many features remain obscure, however, even to high officials of the two governments.

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